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The  decision  of  voter  enrollment  among  Chilean  youth  is re-examined  in  this  paper.  Geographical  and
gender  differences  regarding  what  determines  voter-registration  rate  among  youth  are  also  explored.
Electoral  and  socioeconomic  data  are  collected  from  272  Chilean  counties  in order  to  estimate  the
fractional-response  and  the  random-effects  Tobit  models.  The  results  indicate  that the  voter registration
rate  is  higher  among  lower-income  youth,  which  differs  from  earlier  studies,  and  redefines  the  impli-
cations  of  a  class-biased  electorate  in  Chile.  Furthermore,  the evidence  suggests  an increasing  political
disaffection  among  indigenous  youth  that reside  in  rural  counties.
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La  decisión  de  inscripción  electoral  entre  la  juventud  chilena  es reexaminada  en  esta  investigación.  Igual-
mente,  se exploran  las  diferencias  de  género  y geográficas  en  la  tasa de  inscripción  electoral.  Dado  lo ante-10
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rior, se recopila  información  electoral  y  socioeconómica  para  272  comunas  con  el fin de  estimar  mode-
los de  respuesta-fraccional  y Tobit  con  efecto-aleatorio.  Los  resultados  evidencian  una  mayor  inscripción
electoral  entre  la  juventud  con  menores  ingresos,  lo que  difiere  de estudios  previos,  reformulando  las
implicaciones  de  un  electorado  con  sesgo  de clase  en  Chile.  Adicionalmente,  la  evidencia  sugiere  una
creciente  desafección  política  entre  la juventud  indígena  que reside  en  zonas  rurales.fecto aleatorio
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r  e  s  u  m  o
A  decisão  de  inscric¸ ão  eleitoral  entre  a juventude  chilena  é reexaminada  nesta  pesquisa.  Igualmente,
exploram-se  as  diferenc¸ as de gênero  e geográficas  na  taxa de  inscric¸ ão  eleitoral.  Dado  o anterior,
se  recopila  informac¸ ão  eleitoral  e socioeconómica  para  272 comunas  com  o  fim  de  estimar  modelosalavras-chave:
articipac¸ ão eleitoral
leitorado jovem
esposta fraccionaria
de  resposta  fraccionaria  e Tobit  com  efeito  aleatório.  Os  resultados  evidenciam  una  maior  inscric¸ ão
eleitoral  entre  a juventude  com  rendimento  mais  baixo,  o  que  difere  de  estudos  prévios,  reformulando
as  implicac¸ ões  de  um  eleitorado  com sesgo  de  classe  no  Chile.  Adicionalmente,  a evidencia  sugere  uma
crescente  desafeic¸ ão política  na  juventude  indígena  que  reside  em  áreas  rurais.
©  2017  Universidad  ICESI.  Publicado  por Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este e´  um  artigo  Open  Access  sob uma
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. Introduction
Political apathy among youth has sharply increased over the
ast decade in Western democracies with a voluntary voting rule.
n fact, the European Union has suffered the brunt of this lack
f electoral participation in parliamentary elections with turnout
ates falling below fifty percent in 2004 (Esser & de Vreese, 2007).
n France, the rate of non-registered voters has remained steady
round 10% between 1983 and 2001. Nevertheless, the abstention
ate increased from 21.6 to 32.7% in the same period, with the young
opulation having the lowest levels of voter enrollment (Pan Ke
hon, 2004). Low turnout among British youth has even motivated
he modification of educational curriculum by including citizenship
essons in every secondary school (Kimberlee, 2002). On the other
and, a higher turnout rate has been reported for the youngest or
rst-time voters in some Scandinavian countries. For instance, in
he Danish mayoral election held in 2009, turnout was 57% among
8-year-olds and 42.6% for 21-year-olds (Bhatti, Hansen, & Wass,
012; Wass, 2007).
In the United States, politicians and scholars have shown
oncern about the low turnout rates. This has motivated some
overnment and private efforts to encourage electoral participa-
ion, such as the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 19931
nd Rock the Vote organization. For instance, 21% of citizens aged
8–24 went to the polling stations in the election held in Novem-
er 2010 (Brandon, 2012). According to the Center for Information
nd Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (2013), this trend
eems to have been broken in the 2012 presidential election where
outh turnout was 45%. However, this figure was below 30% in three
tates: Texas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.
On the other hand, mandatory voting has increased turnout in
everal European and Latin American countries (Jackman, 2001;
rasa & Polborn, 2009). Chile joined this group of countries in 1988
y introducing a peculiar voting rule where enrollment was volun-
ary, but voting was mandatory. The return to democracy in this
ountry member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
nd Development (OECD) prompted a mass of young people to reg-
ster in the electoral roll; nonetheless, this pattern was  not the norm
n the last decade (Carlin, 2006; Navia, 2004). In fact, the youth-
ote to electoral-roll ratio in Chile has declined from 36% in 1988
o 9.71% in 2005 (Toro, 2007). Furthermore, the enrollment rate of
hilean youth has experienced a striking downturn from 90.7% in
988 to 17.5% in 2011.
1 Highton and Wolfinger (1998) evaluated the effects of the NVRA on turnout
nd concluded that its impact depends on how politically motivated the target
opulation was, despite costless voting.licenc¸ a CC  BY  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Despite this lack of electoral engagement among Chilean youth,
the National Congress of Chile passed a new voting rule: automatic
enrollment and voluntary voting. The primal goal of the Act No.
20,568 was  to encourage electoral engagement. Nevertheless, its
debut was  inauspicious in the 2012 mayoral election; the overall
abstention rate rose to sixty percent, which has been interpreted
by some political analysts as a potential threat to the legitimacy of
Chilean democracy. Few works (Corvalán & Cox, 2013; Toro, 2007)
have addressed the voter apathy among the young Chilean popu-
lation despite its negative impact on the renewal of the electoral
register and the sustainability of Chilean democracy. These stud-
ies offer appealing remarks, but they do not address the economic
rationale behind the voter registration decision.
This paper re-examines the decision of voter registration among
Chilean youth (ages 18–29) and explores the effects of the gender
and geographical differences that determine the voter-registration
rate. In this context, the theoretical framework for voter enroll-
ment assumes compulsory voting and allows for the outlining of
an empirical model from the aggregation of citizens’ optimal deci-
sions. The longitudinal study uses electoral and socio-economic
data from 272 Chilean counties in order to estimate fractional-
response and random-effects Tobit models. The new evidence
suggests that voter registration is higher among lower-income
youth, which differs from earlier studies and restarts the discussion
about the implications of a class-biased electorate in Chile.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly
reviews the literature on voting behavior and political engagement
among the young population. Section 3 outlines the model for the
voter enrollment decision where democracy is treated as a public
good under a mandatory voting rule. Section 4 describes the data
and the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the main findings.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The first studies on voting behavior were carried out by Downs
(1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and Riker and Ordeshook
(1968). In this classical approach, it was  considered irrational that
individuals would renounce their civic duties and jeopardize the
viability of the political system. Thus, the potential electorate
should value the common good, although a marginal vote may
not be decisive in an election’s outcome. The literature was  mainly
developed in the 1970s based on these insights. Preliminary work in
this field (Barzel & Silberberg, 1973; Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1974; Frey,
1971; May  & Martin, 1975; Tollison & Willett, 1973) focused on
giving a theoretical background to electoral participation, and the
use of assumptions closely linked to economic rationality allowed
one to address major electoral questions.
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whether to be part of the electoral roll or not. This decision is
represented by ri. If citizen i decides to be enrolled in the voter
register, then ri will be equal to one, and zero otherwise. Moreover,A.A. Acun˜a-Duarte / Estudio
Initial empirical work (Settle & Abrams, 1976; Silberman & Dur-
en, 1975; Tollison, Crain, & Pautler, 1975) focused primarily on
he American presidential and senatorial elections. Most of these
lectoral studies used aggregated-level data in order to address the
eterminants of political participation, where demographic, racial,
ender, and economic (e.g., income, unemployment) variables were
sed to explain voter turnout. Matsusaka and Palda (1993) argued
hat previous empirical studies suffered from the ecological fallacy.
sing individual and aggregated level data from Canadian national
lections, they found evidence against the victory margin (or close-
ess) effect and remarked that aggregation bias was  present in
acro-level estimates.2
Since then, voting behavior literature has diversified its scope.
uring the last decade, several studies have been conducted on
outh vote in a variety of political and cultural contexts. Kimberlee
2002) claimed that there is not a single explanation for political
isaffection among British youth. He grouped several explanations
or this phenomenon into four approaches: youth, politics, alter-
ative values, and generational characteristics of young people.
he evidence reported by Wass (2007) for Finland and Esser and
e Vreese (2007) for the United States and the European Union,
or instance, could be classified in the first and fourth approaches
dentified by Kimberlee (2002).
Experiments in political engagement among youth were carried
ut by Blais and Young (1999) and Xenos and Kyoung (2008). An
xperiment conducted by Michelson (2006) aimed at assessing the
ffectiveness of Latino and non-Latino canvassers on voter turnout
n the 2002 gubernatorial election. The experiment was carried out
n Fresno, California, and the results suggested that the effect of can-
asser ethnicity on youth turnout was not statistically significant.
hese findings supported the notion that non-Latino canvassers
ould be hired to reach young Latino voters. Although the canvass-
ng effect on Latino turnout was low for non-voters in the short
erm, it is expected that future door-to-door efforts will turn them
nto systematic voters.
On the other hand, a theoretical discussion on youth vote was
ddressed by Gersbach and Kleinschmidt (2009). The authors pre-
ented a theoretical model where voters from different age groups
i.e., young and old people) interact in order to build a sustainable
emocratic system.
In general, the economic study of electoral engagement in Chile
as not been prolific. To our knowledge, most of the Chilean
lectoral studies have addressed the impact of macroeconomic per-
ormance on election outcomes. Engel and Araos (1989) and Panzer
nd Paredes (1991) analyzed the role of economic variables and
olitical ideologies on the presidential referendum held in 1988.
hey found evidence that the unemployment rate played a key role
n reducing the probability of an incumbent’s re-election, in this
ase the prolongation of General Augusto Pinochet in power. More
ecent investigation from Cerda and Vergara (2007, 2008) supports
he idea that, despite the prevailing economic scenario, the granting
f government subsidies benefits presidential re-election.
In particular, an issue that deserves attention is the sharp down-
urn in voter registration and turnout rates experienced in Chile
hroughout the last fifteen years. Recent evidence (Carlin, 2006;
ontreras & Navia, 2013) suggests that lower voter turnout has
een associated with a generational change in the Chilean elec-
orate. In this regard, the decision of voter registration among the
oung Chilean population has been studied by Toro (2007) and
2 Previously, Lichtman (1974) and Kramer (1983) stressed the issues behind eco-
ogical regressions. Lichtman (1974) pointed out that aggregated estimates exhibit
 smaller specification error than micro-level regressions, while Kramer (1983)
emonstrated that micro-level regressions failed in the attempt to explain the effect
f  the business cycle over voter turnout.nciales 33 (2017) 341–351 343
Corvalán and Cox (2013). Toro (2007) used the 2005 Youth and Pol-
itics survey to address the political behavior of adults aged 18–24
years.3 According to his results, the enrollment probability is influ-
enced by education, age, poverty rate, civic participation, political
socialization inside family and peer groups, and motivational vari-
ables. Corvalán and Cox (2013) used micro-level data from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and found evidence that
the low registration rate of Chilean youth (i.e., ages 18–29) has been
due to income inequalities and decreasing political interest. The
authors remarked that the resulting class-biased electorate con-
stitutes a threat to the legitimacy of Chilean democracy because
wealthier youth are willing to participate more in politics than their
poorer counterparts. Both electoral studies used micro-level data
and offered appealing remarks; however, their empirical approach
does not state explicitly the economic rationale behind voter reg-
istration, a topic that this paper aims to address.
3. Theoretical framework
The current work uses the theoretical framework proposed by
Acun˜a-Duarte (2017) in order to address the decision of voter reg-
istration among Chilean youth.4 The economic rationale behind the
enrollment decision is outlined in the following assumptions and
relationships.
Suppose that a democratic society allows voluntary voter regis-
tration, but mandatory voting. Therefore, abstention is not allowed
in this society, which is populated by n citizens that have prefer-
ences over a consumption good, leisure, and democracy.
The private demand for the consumption good is denoted by x
and its price is given by px. The available time can be distributed
as follows: each citizen (i) can allocate a fraction to work (hi) in
the labor market and earn a nominal wage (w). On the other hand,
the individual can assign a fraction to enjoy leisure (li) in the form
of costless activities that are linked to civic participation. Thus, the
time constraint is: li + hi = 1.
As highlighted by Acun˜a-Duarte (2017), the concept of
democracy used in the model has been restricted to electoral
participation.5 Furthermore, the model recovers the classical
notion argued by Downs (1957) that democracy is a public good.
In this framework, citizens value the democratic institutions that
prevail in the society in order to guarantee the stability of the politi-
cal system and democratic legitimacy. Thus, citizens can contribute
to strengthening democracy, d, by being part of the electoral roll
and performing their civic duties. Therefore, the utility function for
citizen i is given by:
ui(xi, li, d) (1)
where u(·) is a continuous, increasing, and at least twice differ-
entiable function in the consumption good, x, leisure time, l, and
democracy, d.
Regarding civic participation, each individual must decidethe enrollment decision implies a nominal cost cr, which summa-
rizes all the costs related to voting such as transportation costs, a
3 This survey was designed by the Ministry of Social Development (former Min-
istry  of Planning), Institute of Youth, and United Nations Development Programme.
4 The model outlined by Acun˜a-Duarte (2017) tackles the private and social costs
of  voter registration and the potential detriment of being outside the electoral reg-
ister.
5 See May  (1978), Bollen and Grandjean (1981), Collier and Levitsky (1997), and
Coppedge et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion about the concept of democracy.
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The electoral study included only 272 out of 346 Chilean
counties for the following reasons: first, four counties were cre-
ated in 2004; therefore, they were not part of CASEN 2000 and 200344 A.A. Acun˜a-Duarte / Estudio
ne for not attending to vote, or a poll tax.6 Thus, each citizen has
o face the following budget constraint in real terms:
i + ıri ≤ hiω (2)
here ı = cr/px is the real cost of being enrolled as a voter and
 = w/px is the real wage. Note that if automatic enrollment is
ssumed, as it is in the new Chilean voting rule of 2012, then the
oter registration decision, ri, could be interpreted as the voting
ecision. In this case, the key implication of the model remains the
ame. That is, the reduction or removal of voting (or registration)
osts will not guarantee larger turnout rates or avoid a crisis of rep-
esentation, especially if democracy is heterogeneously valued by
itizens.
The population’s willingness to actively participate in the demo-
ratic system can be reflected in the electoral roll, R, which is
omposed of the sum of individuals that decided to be enrolled in
t. Given that democracy d is treated as a public good, assume that d
s a function of the electoral register, R. That is, d = f(R), where f(·) is
 continuous, increasing, and at least twice differentiable function.
To sum up, each citizen i must solve the following problem:
max
{x,l,d}
ui(xi, li, d)
s.t. : xi + ıri ≤ hiω
li + hi = 1
R =
n∑
j=1
rj = ri +
n∑
j /=  i
rj
d = f (R)
(3)
here xi ≥ 0, li and hi ∈ [0, 1], ri = 0, 1, R ≥ 0, and d ≥ 0.
On the other hand, Downs (1962) argued that democratic
overnments’ actions are motivated by the public interest. Con-
equently, in this model the policy maker must search for the
ommon good, which implies solving a problem that can be out-
ined as follows:
max
{x,l,r,d}
n∑
i=1
ui(xi, li, d)
s.t. :
n∑
i=1
xi + ı
n∑
i=1
ri ≤
n∑
i=1
hiω
li + hi = 1
n∑
i=1
ri = R
d = f (R)
(4)
here xi ≥ 0, li and hi ∈ [0;1], ri = 0, 1, R ≥ 0, and d ≥ 0. Combining the
rst-order necessary conditions from the policy maker’s problem,
e have that:
′(R) =
(
ı
ω
) n∑
i=1
∂ui/∂li
∂ui/∂d
= ı
n∑
i=1
∂ui/∂xi
∂ui/∂d
(5)
The above equilibrium condition yields the optimal values for
he demand of the consumption good, x∗
i
, leisure time, l∗
i
, labor
upply, h∗
i
, enrollment status, r∗
i
, supply of democracy, d*, and the
6 Krasa and Polborn (2009) evaluated the effects of asymmetric voting costs and
ubsidies over turnout rate under a compulsory voting system.nciales 33 (2017) 341–351
electoral roll, R*. From these values, the following concepts can be
defined. The voter registration rate, , is given by:
 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
r∗i (6)
In addition, the model allows us to address civic participation
among the population. That is to say, citizens can devote leisure
time to traditional forms of civic participation, which are assumed
to be costless. In that regard, volunteering, sports activities, reli-
gious organizations, student organizations, and union membership
can be classified as civic participation activities. Therefore, the civic
participation rate, , is defined as follows:
 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
l∗i (7)
Notice that an empirical model can be derived from Eq. (5) after
assuming specific functional forms for democracy and utility func-
tions (see Appendix for details). In particular, the voter-registration
rate, , can be estimated from the following empirical specification:
ln i = ˇ1 + ˇ2 ln(ωi) + ˇ3 ln(i) + ˇ4 ln(ıi) + εi (8)
where ω is the real wage,  is the civic participation rate, ı is the
real cost of voter registration,  ˇ represents the parameters to be
estimated, ε the error term, and i might be a county, region, state,
or country. Furthermore, the empirical model defined in Eq. (8)
exhibits two  main characteristics: first, it is consistent with the
classical empirical literature on voting behavior (Silberman & Dur-
den, 1975; Tollison et al., 1975). And second, it was outlined from
the aggregation of citizens’ optimal responses. The next section
describes the empirical strategy used in the current electoral study.
4. Empirical strategy and data
4.1. Data
The electoral study was  focused on the Chilean youth vote. It
used electoral and socio-economic data that was  obtained from the
Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL), National Institute of Statistics
(INE), and the household survey of National Socioeconomic Char-
acterization (CASEN) carried out in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and
2011.7
Preliminary analysis of Chilean electoral data suggests that the
youth vote has lost more than 580,000 voters between 2000 and
2011. Moreover, the youth electorate has lost more male than
female voters during this period. As shown in Fig. 1, the enroll-
ment rate of the former dropped 25.4-percentage points, while the
latter fell 20.2-percentage points over the same period.
The geographical disaggregation revealed that voter registra-
tion among youth has experienced a dramatic downturn in some
regions. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the lowest enrollment rates in 2011
were reported in northern regions, such as Antofagasta (11.9%),
Coquimbo (13.2%), and Atacama (14.8%). In addition, the Metropoli-
tana region, where 40% of the Chilean population is concentrated,
had an enrollment rate of 15.3% in the same year.7 The CASEN household survey has been applied since 1985 by the Ministry of
Social Development, formerly the Ministry of Planning and known as MIDEPLAN,
in  order to retrieve information about the following modules: Residents, Educa-
tion, Labor market, Income, Health, and Housing. In addition, it includes emergent
topics such as wealth and ICT, disability, poverty programs, ethnicity, migration,
autobiography, and civic participation.
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rig. 1. Voter-registration rate among Chilean youth (ages 18–29), period
000–2011.
ource: Electoral Service and National Institute of Statistics, Chile.
urveys.8 Second, 68 counties were not included in the CASEN sur-
ey of the years 2000, 2003, or 2011.9 Finally, Easter Island and Juan
ernandez were not considered in the design of CASEN survey until
011.
Moreover, each county was classified as urban or rural based on
he criteria defined by OECD (2011) which categorizes the regions
f a country as predominantly rural, intermediate, or predomi-
antly urban. This typology considers as classification criteria the
opulation density, rural population, and the presence of urban
enters.10
In that regard, Table 1 details the geographical composition of
he sample’s regional means and standard deviations for voter-
egistration rate among youth, including the percentage of the
oung electorate that was covered by the sample. From this table
t can be inferred that the most densely populated regions (i.e.,
etropolitana, Biobío, and Valparaíso) have, on average, an elec-
orate covered by the sample of greater than 90%, while O’Higgins
egion has the lowest coverage. Accordingly, all the counties
ncluded in the sample represented a 93.2% of youth vote in 2000
nd 89.8% in 2011. In addition, extreme regions of Chile exhibit
arked gender differences in the rate of voter registration among
oung population, e.g., the northern regions of Tarapacá and Arica-
arinacota.
.2. Empirical strategyThe electoral study used three econometric approaches in
rder to address the fact that the dependent variable (i.e., voter-
egistration rate among youth) belongs to the unit interval [0,1].
8 Hualpen was  created on March 13 and Alto Hospicio, Alto Biobio, and Cholchol
n  April 22.
9 This group was  composed by Colchane, Camarones, General Lagos, Ollague,
apallar, Papudo, Calle Larga, Santa Maria, La Cruz, Concon, El Tabo, Algarrobo,
anto Domingo, Codegua, Olivar, Malloa, Quinta de Tilcoco, Pichidegua, Peumo,
oltauco, Coinco, Don˜ihue, Las Cabras, Placilla, Lolol, Pumanque, Palmilla, Peralillo,
avidad, Litueche, La Estrella, Marchigue, Paredones, Mariquina, Los Lagos, Cor-
al,  Mafil, Paillaco, Puyehue, Rio Negro, Llanquihue, Puqueldon, Queilen, Quellon,
haiten, Cochamo, Futaleufu, Hualaihue, Palena, Lago Verde, Cisnes, Guaitecas, Chile
hico, Rio Iban˜ez, Cochrane, O’Higgins, Tortel, Torres del Paine, Rio Verde, Laguna
lanca, San Gregorio, Primavera, Timaukel, Cabo de Hornos, Antartica, Providencia,
itacura, and Lo Barnechea.
10 Brezzi, Dijkstra, and Ruiz (2011) proposed an alternative methodology that
dded two  new categories: predominantly rural, close to a city and predominantly
ural, remote.nciales 33 (2017) 341–351 345
The first approach consisted of the fractional-response-variable
model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). In this regard,
the youth vote ratio was  modeled through the following pooled
fractional logit (PFL) regression:
E[youthvote|X] = exp(Xˇ)
1 + exp(Xˇ) (9)
X  ˇ = ˇ1 + ˇ2 ln incomei + ˇ3participi + ˇ4registrari + ˇ5ethnici
+ ˇ6rurali + ˇ7D2003i + ˇ8D2006i + ˇ9D2009i + ˇ10D2011i
+ ˇ11R02i + ˇ12R03i + · · · + ˇ24R15i + εi
(10)
In this empirical specification, the dependent variable youthvote
was given by the youth-vote-to-population ratio (i.e., 18–29-year-
olds) at the county level.11 This indicator was  also computed for
the male and female electorates using available data at SERVEL.
As described in previous section, the empirical model was out-
lined from the aggregation of optimal decisions made by citizens
who act rationally in politics. That specification suggested the use
of three regressors (real income, civic participation rate, and the
real cost of voter registration), which were computed as follows:
the real income, lnincome, was  measured by the natural logarithm
of the average real income at the county level, expressed in Chilean
pesos of 2015. This regressor was obtained from the CASEN survey
using the variable YAUTAJ that considers the autonomous income
and excludes subsidies from the government. The rate of civic
engagement, particip, for county i was computed from the questions
P18, R18, T18A, and R9, that were included in the CASEN survey
carried out in 2000, 2003, 2009, and 2011.12 Since this sort of ques-
tions was  excluded from CASEN 2006, then the gap was  filled with
the 2003–2009 average.13 The number of voter registrar’s offices,
registrar, in county i was  used as a proxy for the cost of voter reg-
istration. During the 2000–2011 period, 56 new registrar’s offices
were created, reaching 564 voter-enrollment places by the end of
the year 2011.
Moreover, the rate of ethnic population, ethnic,  and the share
of rural population, rural, were used as control variables. The rate
of ethnic population in county i, ethnic,  considered those ethnic
groups recognized by the Chilean Indigenous Act and listed in
the CASEN survey, that is: Aymara, Rapa-nui, Quechua, Mapuche,
Atacamen˜o, Coya, Kawesqar, Yagan, and Diaguita. Finally, in the
above empirical model, D2003, D2006, D2009, and D2011 are year
dummies; R01, R02, R03, R04, . . .,  and R15 are regional dummies;
and ε is the error term.
In the second approach, the empirical strategy adopted the
panel-data approach in the form of a two-limit random effects Tobit
(2LRET) model.14 Thus, under the corner-solution specification, the
empirical model can be stated as follows:
youthvoteit =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 If it = 0 (rj = 0 for all j = 1, . . .,  n)
it If 0 < it < 1 (rj /= 0 for some j)
1 If it = 1 (rj = 1 for all j  = 1, . . ., n)
(11)where youthvoteit denotes the voter-registration rate, i.e. youth
vote ratio, in county i at time t, rj is the enrollment decision of a
11 Endersby and Krieckhaus (2008) discussed the consequences of using the elec-
toral roll instead of voting age population in the computation of voter turnout.
12 These questions include the following civic participation options: neighborhood
association, sports club, religious organization, art group, cultural-identity group,
students’ association, women’s organization, elderly group, voluntary association,
self-help group, parent-teacher association, ideological and interest group, union,
and  political party.
13 See Ministerio de Planificación (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009) and Ministerio de
Desarrollo Social (2011) for details.
14 See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 16) for details.
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Sig. 2. Voter-registration rate among Chilean youth by region, years 2000 and 2011
ource: Electoral Service and National Institute of Statistics, Chile.
itizen j that resides in a county populated by n individuals, and it
s given by:
it = ˇ1 + ˇ2lnincomeit + ˇ3participit + ˇ4registrarit
+ˇ5ethnicit + ˇ6ruralit + ˇ7ballotit + ci + it
(12)
here the variables lnincome, particip, registrar, ethnic,  and rural
re defined as above. In this second empirical specification, year
ummies were replaced with the binary variable ballot in order
o control the effect of an impending election on voter registra-
ion. That is, the variable ballot takes the value of one if an election
s held in time t and zero otherwise. During the sample period,
hree elections were held in Chile: the 2000 mayoral election, and
he 2009 presidential and congressional elections. Finally, ci is the
nobserved heterogeneity and it the idiosyncratic error, where ci
nd it are independent, ci|X∼N(0, 2c ), and it |X, ci∼N(0, 2).
And for the third approach, the electoral study followed
apke and Wooldridge (2008) in order to broaden the panel-data
able 1
ample composition and descriptive indicators at the regional level, years 2000–2011.
Regions of Chile Number of counties V
Urban Rural Total Total population 
Mean Std. dev. 
1st Tarapacá 0 6 6 0.687 0.33 
2nd  Antofagasta 1 7 8 0.403 0.27 
3rd  Atacama 0 9 9 0.321 0.13 
4th  Coquimbo 2 13 15 0.282 0.16 
5th  Valparaiso 11 16 27 0.292 0.12 
6th  O’Higgins 3 10 13 0.296 0.12 
7th  Maule 1 29 30 0.398 0.19 
8th  Biobío 9 43 52 0.422 0.19 
9th  Araucanía 2 29 31 0.420 0.15 
10th  Los Lagos 2 19 21 0.356 0.15 
11th  Aysen 0 2 2 0.503 0.23 
12th  Magallanes 0 3 3 0.669 0.26 
13th  Metropolitana 38 11 49 0.225 0.12 
14th  Los Ríos 1 6 7 0.368 0.13 
15th  Arica-Parinacota 0 4 4 0.668 0.36 
ource: Electoral Service and National Institute of Statistics, Chile.approach. The technique was developed by the authors for a frac-
tional dependent variable, where the unobserved heterogeneity is
allowed to be correlated with regressors as suggested by Mundlak
(1978) and Chamberlain (1980). Hence, the fractional response
probit (FRP) model for the voter-registration rate among youth is
outlined as follows:
E[youthvoteit |X, c] = ˚(Xitˇi + ci) (13)
Xitˇi = ˇ1 + ˇ2lnincomeit + ˇ3participit + ˇ4registrarit
+ˇ5ethnicit + ˇ6ruralit + ˇ7ballotit + it
(14)
ci =  + X¯i	 + ai (15)
where ˚(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
the regressors lnincome, particip, ethnic,  registrar, rural, and ballot
are defined as above, it is the idiosyncratic error, and the unob-
served heterogeneity ci is distributed ci|X∼N(  + X¯i	, 2a ), where
X¯i is the 1 × m vector of time averages for time-varying regressors.
oter-registration rate among youth Covered electorate
Male population Female population
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
0.740 0.33 0.576 0.34 87.62
0.422 0.28 0.383 0.26 98.57
0.309 0.14 0.335 0.13 100.00
0.278 0.17 0.291 0.15 100.00
0.307 0.15 0.285 0.12 91.19
0.286 0.13 0.311 0.13 68.98
0.389 0.20 0.413 0.20 100.00
0.420 0.20 0.431 0.20 97.70
0.433 0.18 0.414 0.15 99.07
0.367 0.17 0.352 0.14 83.68
0.613 0.28 0.348 0.12 77.65
0.825 0.24 0.368 0.16 90.81
0.227 0.12 0.226 0.12 89.46
0.391 0.14 0.351 0.13 77.42
0.716 0.33 0.626 0.40 93.12
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Table  2
Estimates of the pooled fractional logit (PFL), two-limit random effects Tobit (2LRET), and fractional response probit (FRP) models for youth vote ratio, all counties.
Model: PFL 2LRET FRP
Estimation method: Pooled quasi MLE Random effects Generalized estimating equation
Dependent variable: Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
Voter  registration rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnincome −0.052 −0.011 −0.140*** −0.124*** −0.397*** −0.137***
(0.119) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.012)
particip 0.994*** 0.206*** 0.414*** 0.367*** 1.072*** 0.370***
(0.262) (0.055) (0.032) (0.035) (0.109) (0.037)
registrar −0.065* −0.013* −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.093*** −0.032***
(0.037) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.031) (0.011)
ethnic −0.111 −0.023 −0.276*** −0.244*** −0.979*** −0.338***
(0.360) (0.083) (0.043) (0.058) (0.205) (0.069)
rural  0.837*** 0.174*** 0.177*** 0.157*** 0.487*** 0.168***
(0.181) (0.039) (0.025) (0.030) (0.143) (0.049)
ballot  0.128*** 0.115*** 0.351*** 0.123***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Year  dummies Yes No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time-averaged regressors No No Yes
Observations 1360 1360 1360
Groups 272 272
Scale  factor 0.208 0.885 0.345
Left-censored obs. 0
Right-censored obs. 29
Wald test:
2statistic 1862.9 1627.0 1603.1
LR  test of 2c :

2statistic 712.6
Source: author’s calculations.
Note: Standard errors (SE) for coefficients and APEs are reported in parentheses. In the case of the latter, SE were computed from 1000 bootstrap replications.
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nicity’s effect on youth vote was negative and significant at the
1% level (columns 3–6, Table 2). This result may  confirm the pres-
ence of a certain disaffection among indigenous people for beingp < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
In order to explore gender and geographical differences in voter-
egistration rate, the above models were estimated for male and
emale populations and for urban and rural counties. The results
re discussed below.
. Main findings and discussion
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and average partial
ffects (APE) from the three econometric approaches described in
revious section, i.e., pooled fractional logit (PFL), two-limit ran-
om effects Tobit (2LRET), and fractional response probit (FRP). In
eneral, the coefficients and APEs were significant at the 1% level
or all regressors, except the income and ethnicity effects that were
ot significant in the PFL model. Moreover, the likelihood-ratio test
eported for the 2LRET model confirmed that the panel-level vari-
nce component is relevant; thus, a pooled Tobit regression can be
iscarded.
In particular, the estimates revealed the following facts concern-
ng the decision of voter registration among Chilean youth: first,
he income effect (lnincome) was negative and significant at the
ne percent level when the panel data approach was employed
columns 3–6, Table 2). This finding differs from previous results
eported in Chilean literature on youth vote (Corvalán & Cox, 2013;
oro, 2007) which used cross-section data from a survey. One of
he disadvantages of using individual-level data is that it tends to
nder-estimate the rural population and over-estimate the voter
urnout (Kimberlee, 2002). In addition, this finding adds new ele-
ents to the discussion about the repercussion of class bias on voter
egistration and electoral engagement, an issue where the evidence
as been diverse (Avery & Peffley, 2005; Cavanagh, 1981; Leighley
 Nagler, 1992).
Second, the largest partial effect belonged to civic participation
ate whose positive effect suggests a predominant role of social
apital in electoral engagement among the Chilean youth popula-
ion (columns 1–6, Table 2). This is in line with preceding evidencefrom Toro (2007), who found a direct relationship between being
part of political, social, or ecological groups and the likelihood of
voter enrollment.
Third, and contrary to what had been expected, the estimates
were unsuccessful in proving that a greater number of voter reg-
istrar’s offices increases the enrollment probability among youth.
During the sample period, the Chilean Electoral Service had enabled
56 new public facilities devoted to voter registration, 35 of them
in rural counties; nevertheless, the estimated effect was nega-
tive (columns 1–6, Table 2). An argument that could explain this
result is that, although the amount of local election offices has
increased since 2000, the closing date for registration has not been
eliminated.15 This certainly goes against scholar consensus that
registration mechanisms should be uncomplicated and exempt
from inconveniences for citizens in order to increase voter turnout
(Stone, 1985; Highton, 1997, 2004). As suggested by Navia (2004)
and Contreras and Navia (2013), this legal constraint has acted as
a barrier to voter participation, producing a negative effect on the
voter enrollment rate during the last decade.
Regarding control variables, county-level data encompassed in
the current study permitted an examination of the heterogeneity
of extreme zones and enclaves more distant from urban centers.
Indeed, rurality had positively influenced the voter registration
among Chilean youth, with the coefficient being individually sig-
nificant at the one percent level under the three econometric
approaches (columns 1–6, Table 2).
The evidence from panel-data regressions suggested that eth-15 Since its modification in 1989, article 22 from Act No. 18,556 of 1986 stated that
an election office would be operative until 120 days before the election. This was
modified in 2005 by Act No. 20,010, which shortened the closing date to 90 days.
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nvolved in the Chilean democratic system. Similar findings have
een reported by Silberman and Durden (1975) for Afro-American
opulations in the United States and Aleksynska (2011) for immi-
rant populations in Europe who come from developing countries.
The dummy  variable ballot explained about twelve percentage
oints of the voter enrollment rate, which roughly amounts to 1200
ew young voters per county (columns 2–3 and 5–6, Table 2). This
uggests that a new election remains a source of motivation for
oter registration and turnout among the Chilean youth population.
As stated in the introduction, this manuscript explores the dif-
erences in voter registration among Chilean youth considering
ender and geographical groups. In connection with the point
bove, Table 3 reports the estimated APEs for male and female pop-
lation. In general, the results for the female population were quite
imilar to those shown in Table 2; that is, the parameters were sig-
ificant at the 1% level for most regressors, except the ethnicity
ffect in the PFL model (columns 1 and 4, Table 3).
Moreover, the income, election office, and ethnicity effects were
ot significant in the PFL model for the male electorate (column
, Table 3). In particular, real income and registrar office effects
emained negative, while the impact of civic participation and
urality stayed positive and significant at the 1% level in both elec-
orates. No convincing evidence was found for the ethnicity effect
n youth vote when the pooled logit regression was run (columns
 and 4, Table 3).
In addition, a chi-square test of difference between groups
as used in order to test whether the estimated coefficients dif-
ered among male and female population. The corresponding null
ypothesis can be stated as H0 : ˆˇmalei = ˆˇ
female
i
. Most of these differ-
nces were not statistically significant at the 5% level; nonetheless,
he impact of civic participation on voter registration was
tatistically greater at the 5% level for the male electorate (see
ppendix, Table A1). This result confirms the need for a gender
olicy that promotes the generation of social capital among Chilean
outh.
able 3
verage partial effects (APE) of the pooled fractional logit (PFL), two-limit random effec
ale  and female population.
Male population
Dependent variable: PFL 2LRET 
Voter  registration rate (1) (2) 
lnincome 0.008 −0.103***
(0.021) (0.012) 
particip 0.109** 0.354***
(0.050) (0.029) 
registrar −0.008 −0.019***
(0.008) (0.007) 
ethnic  −0.004 −0.180***
(0.075) (0.051) 
rural  0.166*** 0.132***
(0.038) (0.030) 
ballot  0.115***
(0.005) 
Year  dummies Yes No 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Time-averaged regressors No No 
Observations 1360 1360 
Groups 272 
Scale  factor 0.206 0.848 
Left-censored obs. 0 
Right-censored obs. 42 
Wald test: 
2 statistic 1545.7 1221.5 
LR  test of 2c : 

2 statistic 516.9 
ource: author’s calculations.
ote: Standard errors in parentheses were computed from 1000 bootstrap replications.
* p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.nciales 33 (2017) 341–351
Regarding geographical differences, Table 4 reports the esti-
mated APEs for urban and rural counties, while Table A2
summarizes the chi-square test of difference across both groups.
From these tables, five aspects can be highlighted: first, the
evidence confirmed the negative influence of real income on
voter registration among Chilean youth, which was larger for
rural counties. Second, the APE associated with civic participation
remained positive but higher than previous findings reported in
Tables 2 and 3. Third, no significant correlation was found between
the number of election offices and the registration rate in urban
counties. Fourth, the effect of an impending election (i.e., dummy
variable ballot) kept close to twelve percent, significant at the one
percent level, and was  lower for the urban electorate. And fifth,
there was a significant negative correlation between the rate of
ethnic population and the enrollment rate in rural counties. This
suggests that political disaffection is an increasing phenomenon
among the indigenous population that resides in suburban areas.
6. Conclusions
Political disaffection among youth is a global concern that
deserves the attention of the authorities, public, and scholarly com-
munity. Counter-intuitively, this pattern of citizen behavior is not
exclusive to democratic countries that have adopted a voluntary
voting system. In Latin America, Chile has recently moved from
a mandatory to a voluntary voting rule. This policy was imple-
mented despite the increasing lack of electoral participation among
young people over the last decade. Nonetheless, few works have
addressed the electoral apathy among Chilean youth, despite its
negative consequences on the long-term sustainability of ChileanThis paper has re-examined the determinants of voter registra-
tion among Chilean youth and explored the existence of gender and
geographical differences in this behavior. The evidence from the
ts Tobit (2LRET), and fractional response probit (FRP) models for youth vote ratio,
Female population
FRP PFL 2LRET FRP
(3) (4) (5) (6)
−0.121*** −0.027* −0.082*** −0.086***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
0.384*** 0.203*** 0.263*** 0.257***
(0.034) (0.055) (0.037) (0.040)
−0.050*** −0.020*** −0.022*** −0.032***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
−0.260*** −0.001 −0.157*** −0.237***
(0.064) (0.082) (0.050) (0.056)
0.158*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.176***
(0.049) (0.036) (0.029) (0.049)
0.127*** 0.114*** 0.121***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
No Yes No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes No No Yes
1360 1360 1360 1360
272 272 272
0.344 0.210 0.903 0.348
0
22
1239.3 1328.1 1226.2 1068.8
600.3
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Table  4
Average partial effects (APE) of the pooled fractional logit (PFL), two-limit random effects Tobit (2LRET), and fractional response probit (FRP) models for youth vote ratio,
urban  and rural counties.
Urban counties Rural counties
Dependent variable: PFL 2LRET FRP PFL 2LRET FRP
Voter  registration rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnincome 0.084** −0.068*** −0.111*** −0.079*** −0.149*** −0.157***
(0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015)
particip 0.156** 0.401*** 0.380*** 0.301*** 0.403*** 0.394***
(0.080) (0.050) (0.047) (0.070) (0.042) (0.048)
registrar −0.005 −0.000 −0.009 −0.025*** −0.034*** −0.046***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015)
ethnic −0.150 −0.218** −0.130 0.042 −0.207*** −0.350***
(0.156) (0.108) (0.111) (0.095) (0.047) (0.083)
ballot  0.103*** 0.106*** 0.127*** 0.133***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Year  dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-averaged regressors No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 350 350 350 1010 1010 1010
Groups 70 70 202 202
Scale  factor 0.172 0.932 0.296 0.219 0.900 0.361
Left-censored obs. 0 0
Right-censored obs. 0 37
Wald  test: 
2 statistic 1264.5 446.0 885.7 1287.7 1100.7 1077.6
LR  test of 2c : 

2 statistic 102.0 509.1
Source: author’s calculations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses were computed from 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Finally, the electoral study has a number of potential limitations
that need to be considered. First, economic and social variables
at the county-level are not available on a yearly basis, although
Table A1
Tests of difference between male and female population.
Variables PFL 2LRET FRP

2 statistic p > 
2 
2 statistic p > 
2 
2 statistic p > 
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnincome 1.68 0.195 3.92 0.048 4.41 0.036
particip 1.56 0.211 7.85 0.005 6.28 0.012
registrar 1.04 0.307 0.03 0.870 1.27 0.260* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
ractional-response and random-effects Tobit regressions reveals
hat real income, civic engagement, rurality, and an impending
lection determine the voter enrollment among Chilean youth.
ased on the theoretical framework’s implications, these variables
ould be valid determinants of turnout rates among youth if the
odel assumes automatic registration, mimicking the Chilean vot-
ng rule in force. This seems plausible due to the high correlation
etween voter registration and turnout rates (Erikson, 1981; High-
on, 1997, 2004; Wolfinger, Highton, & Mullin, 2005).
Moreover, the macro-level evidence confirms the existence of
roup differences (i.e., male and female, urban and rural) in terms
f what determines their voter registration decision. In fact, this
esearch provides additional support for the existence of political
isaffection among indigenous youth that reside in rural counties,
hich has not been identified in previous research focused on Chile.
The results further suggest that the voter registration rate is
igher among lower-income youth, which contradicts the micro-
evel findings reported by Toro (2007) and Corvalán and Cox
2013). Although these studies offered appealing remarks, they
aise questions about the economic rationale behind the voter reg-
stration decision. It should be noted that the current electoral study
ddressed this issue, where the empirical strategy followed a the-
retical model whose solution allowed for the derivation of an
mpirical specification from rational voting behavior. Controversial
r not, these findings restart the discussion about the implica-
ions of a class-biased electorate in the Chilean democracy. The
ew evidence confirms that the young population with the highest
ndowment of human capital is becoming reluctant to participate
n the Chilean political system. Therefore, the consequences could
e even more harmful than those highlighted by Corvalán and Cox
2013) because the Chilean democracy is not making use of the
ositive externalities from citizens with higher schooling rates,
uch as an improved and more complex sorts of participation
Milligan, Moretti, & Oreopoulos, 2004). As a consequence, a less-
ducated electorate could be fertile ground for the emergence of a
opulist “caudillo” (warlord).Gender differences reported for Chilean youth vote suggest that
the female population would be less sensitive to a policy aimed at
reinforcing social capital. This evidence has significant implications
on the promotion of higher political interest or electoral engage-
ment among the young population. Thus, policy makers should
design a gender policy that encourages active participation in civic
organizations. In this context, the challenge facing future govern-
ments is the ability to design policies that encourage the integration
of young people into the political environment by breaking away
from the current cultural paradigm of citizen participation, in order
to strengthen the democratic tradition in Chile.
On the other hand, a fraction of Chilean youth seems to be highly
motivated to participate in the democratic system and fulfill their
civic duty, that is, by registering to vote and attending polling sta-
tions in every election. As a matter of fact, the evidence implies that
youth turnout will be increased by about 400,000 people in a sub-
sequent election under the voting rule in force. This figure is fairly
close to the number of young voters that the Chilean electoral roll
lost between 2000 and 2011, which constitutes a hopeful sign for
democratic legitimacy in Chile.ethnic 0.00 0.972 0.40 0.525 0.09 0.764
rural 0.06 0.803 1.35 0.245 0.05 0.828
ballot – – 1.44 0.231 1.60 0.206
Source: author’s calculations.
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oter-registration and electoral data can be collected annually from
hilean Electoral Service (SERVEL). Second, Chilean counties do not
eport auxiliary information that permits the incorporation of new
ontrol variables or an increase in the sample size. Despite this, the
urrent work could be a starting point for future studies on youth
ote in compulsory voting countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, or
ustralia. Certainly, this research will contribute to elucidate the
bove findings.
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ppendix. Derivation of the empirical model from the
ggregation of optimal individual decisions
This section describes the derivation of the empirical model
rom the social solution stated in Eq. (5). In particular, suppose for
he sake of simplicity, that citizens are homogeneous and utility
unction is given by:
i(xi, li, d) = 1 ln xi + 2 ln li + 3 ln d (A1)
In addition, assume that the democracy function is given by:
 = f (R) = R
2
n
(A2)
The function stated by (A2) implies a bounded supply of democ-
acy. That is, a full-enrollment equilibrium will bind the supply
f democracy to n, while a crisis of representation will result in
 public-good supply that tends to zero.
By substituting the partial derivatives of (A1) and (A2) into Eq.
5), it is trivial to verify that:2R∗
n
=
(
ı
ω
) n∑
i=1
2
l∗
i
d∗
3
(A3)
able A2
ests of difference between urban and rural counties.
Variables PFL 2LRET FRP

2 statistic p > 
2 
2 statistic p > 
2 
2 statistic p > 
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnincome 18.27 0.000 14.54 0.000 0.51 0.474
particip 0.81 0.369 0.07 0.786 0.86 0.355
registrar 1.82 0.177 8.91 0.003 3.37 0.066
ethnic 2.00 0.158 0.00 0.970 1.42 0.233
ballot – – 12.32 0.000 0.59 0.442
ource: author’s calculations.nciales 33 (2017) 341–351
where l∗
i
, R*, and d* denote the optimal values for leisure, electoral
roll, and democracy, respectively. After rearranging condition (A3),
we have that:
R∗ =
n∑
i=1
r∗i =
(
2ω3
ı2
) n∑
i=1
l∗i (A4)
Dividing both sides of Eq. (A4) by population, n, then the optimal
registration rate, *, can be expressed as:
∗ =
(
2ω3
ı2
)
∗ (A5)
where * = R*/n and ∗ = (1/n)
∑
il
∗
i
are the optimal voter-
registration and civic participation rates, respectively. The
log-linearization of equation (A5) implies that:
ln ∗ = ln(23/2) + ln(ω) + ln(∗) − ln(ı) (A6)
Hence, an empirical specification for the voter-registration rate,
, can be stated from Eq. (A6) as follows:
ln i = ˇ1 + ˇ2 ln(ωi) + ˇ3 ln(i) + ˇ4 ln(ıi) + εi (A7)
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